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Once again a specter is haunting Europe—not in the shape that Marx saw it but in the form of 
outsourcing and offshoring, which allegedly will empty Europe of the highly skilled high-paying jobs 
of the future. This working paper argues that the specter needs to be dispelled. Today, Europe faces 
challenges in the form of low productivity growth and low labor utilization/high unemployment.1 
Outsourcing and offshoring, far from being a blight, are powerful tools to help solve the productivity 
growth problem and may also—provided the right structural reforms are implemented—assist in 
solving Europe’s low employment problem.  
European governments must realize that offshoring and outsourcing are not simply “a trade 
issue” but require policy responses on far broader fronts, such as labor markets, education, and 
regional policies. Auspiciously, EU members2 already have many of the required solutions at hand in 
the Lisbon Agenda to generate both higher productivity growth and higher employment from 
outsourcing and offshoring—what matters is that they are implemented.  
Managing the impact of outsourcing and offshoring presents an opportunity to solve 
Europe’s most pressing problems of low productivity growth and low employment. Outsourcing and 
offshoring, however, also connote a very important additional imperative for structural reforms in 
Europe. European economies cannot simply opt out of either outsourcing or offshoring, and the two 
will substantially increase the costs to Europe of not quickly implementing relevant parts of the 
Lisbon Agenda and other reforms. Today Europe, through offshoring and outsourcing, is feeling the 
“gaiatsu” of an outside world that has raised its game in terms of competitiveness and human talent 
to new heights. This rapid development of the world around them must make European decision 
makers realize that the status quo is now even less sustainable. If Europe stands still now, it will be 
run over. 
This working paper starts off with a brief discussion of the definition of outsourcing and 
offshoring and in section II attempts to grasp from available sources the extent of outsourcing and 
offshoring in Europe. Section III identifies the winners and losers from the phenomenon in the EU-
15. Section IV details which of Europe’s policy areas currently pose obstacles to the continent 
benefiting from offshoring and outsourcing, and section V provides prescriptions to remedy these 
impediments and indicates what Europe should do to utilize outsourcing and offshoring to solve her 
underlying structural problems of low productivity growth and low employment. Concluding remarks 
round up the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For an extensive discussion of Europe’s structural problems, see Baily and Kirkegaard (2004). 
2 For the purposes of this working paper, Europe is synonymous with the EU-15.   3
I. DEFINING OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 
 
While in the United States the current debate on outsourcing and offshoring seems almost entirely 
focused on the loss to India of US software programming jobs, in Europe the discussions of 
offshoring, outsourcing, delocalization, the “bazaar-economy,”3 and deindustrialization are significantly 
wider in scope and effectively concern the entire economy. In some respects, this broader current 
European debate probably reflects a “rolling into one debate” of several debates that have raged in 
the United States in the last couple of decades about the merits of free trade in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), about global production platforms for reexports of goods and 
services back into the United States, and about foreign trade (deficits) in general. This working paper 
therefore initially adopts a broad definition, which warrants a brief discussion.4 
  Outsourcing refers to the purchasing of intermediate inputs by companies (or governments) 
at arm’s length. Raw material inputs are excluded. For instance, purchases of raw steel by 
Volkswagen would not be outsourcing, but if Volkswagen decided to purchase the doors for its cars 
from a supplier, rather than manufacture them itself, it would have “outsourced its production of car 
doors.” Similarly, if Credit Lyonnais decided to hire a cleaning company to clean its offices, rather 
than have cleaners on its own payroll, it would have “outsourced its cleaning services.” It is 
important to realize that this phenomenon is not new and has been going on since at least the 
industrial revolution. It is effectively synonymous with the distribution of labor and with companies 
remaining competitive and cost-conscious while specializing in what they do best. What is new, 
however, is that information and communication technology (ICT) in recent years has made 
outsourcing of whole new types of services possible. IT and cheap communication today facilitate 
companies to outsource most things that can be reproduced/conducted in digital form, such as IT 
support, back office (payroll administration and accounting), call-centers, software programming, and 
some R&D functions. Similarly, ICT has enabled additional outsourcing in goods manufacturing, as 
intermediate inputs can now be seamlessly sourced from multiple suppliers. Just-in-time production 
techniques, which Toyota invented in the pre-IT period, today rely heavily on ICT. 
  Offshoring refers to the acquisition of intermediate inputs by companies (or governments) 
from locations outside the consuming country. It is the crossing of international borders that 
distinguishes it from outsourcing in general. 5 Offshoring may take the form of a transfer of 
                                                 
3 A “bazaar economy” is a national economy that sells goods originating in a variety of international locations 
and only a few goods produced on national territory. See DIW (2004). 
4 For narrower definitions of both offshoring and outsourcing, see Kirkegaard (2004), Mann (2003), Cronin, 
Catchpowle, and Hall (2004), van Welsum (2004), and Amiti and Wei (2004). 
5 Alternatively, offshore is “at a significant physical distance from the location of the consumer;” see Forrester 
(2004a). EFILWC (2004) quotes an EU-wide survey showing that in 2000 only 5.3 percent of establishments   4
particular tasks within an organization to a foreign location―for instance, Lufthansa opening a new 
accounting department in Poland for company use is offshoring but not outsourcing. An important 
distinction must be made between offshoring and foreign direct investment (FDI). Not all FDI is 
offshoring. If ST Microelectronics decides to build a factory in China to serve the Chinese market, 
then it is FDI in China but not necessarily offshoring. The distinction is blurred if a company moves 
an entire domestic production facility abroad and then imports the produced goods (or services) back 
into its home country—for instance, Benetton moves its Italian shirt production to China and imports 
Chinese-made Benetton shirts back to Italy.6 The distinction between FDI, global sourcing, and 
offshoring might seem to hinge on the very difficult demarcation of what is an intermediate input, 
what is a final good or service, and where this good or service is sold. Yet, nonetheless the distinction 
is for the purposes of this working paper sensible, as many of the underlying issues that drive FDI 
and global sourcing affect outsourcing and offshoring to a much smaller degree. Focusing on 
intermediate inputs helps isolate the issues that propel outsourcing and offshoring, rather than affect 
the related, but distinct area of FDI. In particular, subject areas such as host-nation corporate tax 
rates and accounting rules for transfer pricing are well known to play a large role in locational FDI 
decisions of multinational companies but are of limited importance for companies’ decisions on what 
to outsource.7 
Offshoring may also occur as purchases of intermediate inputs at arm’s length from foreign 
suppliers, in which case one may describe it as offshore outsourcing. When AXA uses the Indian 
company Wipro for IT application maintenance, or BMW switches to buying car parts from a Czech 
supplier for use in Bavaria, it is offshore outsourcing. 
Again, it must be stressed that this is not an entirely new phenomenon but that the rapid 
development in ICT and the accompanying drop in the cost of communication have enabled many 
new inputs of particularly services to be traded across borders—if it can be outsourced, then it can 
generally also be offshored. Today such tasks as technical drawing in architecture,8 radiologist 
readings of X-rays,9 or certain legal services10 may be sent overseas. Hence, the development of ICT 
has expanded international trade by lowering transaction costs and making entirely new things 
                                                                                                                                                 
surveyed had outsourced tasks to locations outside their home country, compared with 34.5 percent that had 
outsourced tasks to their local area.  
6 Such a strategy would however best be classified as “global sourcing,” rather than offshoring. 
7 For an excellent overview of literature on the importance of corporate taxation rates on corporate FDI 
decisions, see Hines (1996). 
8 “Designs for Western Living from the East,” Financial Times, September 2, 2003, 9. 
9 “The Future of Work Survey,” Financial Times, September 27, 2004, 6. 
10 “Caseload Grows for Advocates in Absentia,” Financial Times, October 4, 2004, 8.   5
tradeable.11 This is not unlike the impact of the international container system in the 1950s, which 
also caused international trade to soar.12  
The focus of this working paper is on offshoring and offshore outsourcing and not purely 
on domestic outsourcing, although the fact that the European Union consists of 25 countries does 
muddy the waters, in the sense that offshore outsourcing between two EU member states for the 
purposes of EU-level regulation might be considered domestic in character. This highlights the fact 
that the EU-25 contains both consumers and suppliers of offshored and offshore outsourced goods 
and services, which adds an additional layer of complexity to the required “European response to 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing,” which will be discussed below. 
 
II. EXTENT OF OFFSHORING AND OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING IN EUROPE 
 
Numerous pitfalls lie in the way of trying to validly quantify a phenomenon that has no commonly 
agreed-upon definition (offshoring and offshore outsourcing), whose “perpetrators” have clear 
incentives to remain unnoticed (companies laying off workers because of offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing), and whose coverage by official statistical data collection is in its infancy (services 
sectors and multinational companies), but nonetheless is high on the media and politicians’ agendas.13 
No authoritative official statistical number exists on the extent of offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing in Europe, and no coordinated official attempt, national or EU-level, to gauge it has 
been made.14 It is important to grasp that the very dearth of such solid statistical quantification of 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing in Europe will inevitably fuel the widespread public anxiety 
about the issue. BusinessWeek’s February 3, 2003, cover story “Is Your Job Next?” amply captures the 
public mood.15 But without solid statistics, we simply do not know if your European job is next. 
In the absence of solid data, one must search for proxies to get a sense of how widespread 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing is in Europe. Several industry experts and consultants have put 
forward estimates and predictions, generally based on interview surveys with European company 
executives. Forrester Research, whose November 2002 projection of 3.3 million jobs lost in the 
                                                 
11 See, among others, Van Welsum (2004), Amiti and Wei (2004), Bardhan and Jaffee (2004), Whichard (2003), 
Mann (2004a), and Mann (forthcoming) for examples of increases in international trade in intermediate inputs 
and services. 
12 For data on the growth in postwar maritime trade, see UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transports, annual 
reports at www.unctad.org.  
13 Amiti and Wei (2004) found 2,634 reports in US newspapers and 380 reports in British newspapers linking 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing to job losses between January 2004 and May 2004. 
14 Similarly in the United States, where a recent report from the GAO had the telling title “Current 
Government Data Provide Limited Insight into Offshoring of Services,” GAO (2004). 
15 “Deutschland: Export Weltmeister (von Arbeitsplätzen)” (“Germany: World Exports Champion (of Jobs)”), 
Der Spiegel, October 25, 2004, is a recent similar European headline.    6
United States by 2015 can almost be seen as having framed the entire subsequent US debate on the 
issue,16 estimated in August 2004 that 81,000 IT and other services sector jobs had been sent outside 
Europe and that the number would rise to 1.16 million by 2015.17 With 56.7 million people employed 
in the EU-15 in services18 in 2003, this would indicate that 0.14 percent of the EU-15 services sector 
jobs had been shifted offshore in mid-2004 and that assuming zero employment growth in the EU-
15 until 2015, roughly 2 percent of EU-15 service-sector employment is at risk. Hence it is important 
to emphasize that―like in the United States―only a very small fraction of all services jobs are likely 
affected in the EU-15. According to Forrester, Britain will account for the largest share (two-thirds) 
of the services jobs at risk. Language and cultural barriers to a degree insulate most European 
countries against much competition from India, for instance―cold comfort perhaps for British 
workers. But, other major European languages, such as German, French, and Spanish, may see 
increased low-wage language-based competition from Eastern Europe (German), North Africa 
(French), and Latin America (Spanish), respectively. Nonetheless, Eurostat (2004) reports that from 
2000 to 2003, employment in knowledge-intensive services in the EU-15 grew at a rate twice as fast 
as that in less knowledge-intensive services. 
Likewise, software-programming languages are “spoken globally,” so in strictly IT/software 
programming jobs, non-English speaking countries in Europe will not be linguistically sheltered. 
Forrester (2004) estimates that 31,000 jobs in IT-related occupations only had been moved outside 
the EU-15 and Switzerland by mid-2004, and that this will rise to 150,000 by 2015. The European 
Commission (2004) provides detailed estimates for the “computer and related services sector”19 in 
the EU-15 and EU-25, which shows that between 2002 and 2003, 23,500 jobs were created in the 
EU-15 and that average annual job creation in the sector was 175,000 from 1995 to 2002 in the EU-
15. It thus does seem as if job growth in the EU-15 IT sector has slowed since 2002 but nonetheless 
is still present. It would, however, be erroneous to simply conclude that the growth slowdown is due 
to offshoring and offshore outsourcing alone, as the “computer and related services sector” is also 
                                                 
16 See Kirkegaard (2004) for an in-depth analysis of this number. 
17 See Forrester (2004). In this report, offshoring is defined as the use of services delivered by a provider based 
in a country at least 500 miles away from the country where the buyer is located and where the country of 
delivery has a cost base at least 50 percent lower than the buyer company’s country. Forrester calculates 
numbers for the EU-15, plus Switzerland, but for the purposes of these calculations, Switzerland has been 
subtracted. 
18 Defined as NACE categories G (Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and 
personal and household goods), H (Hotels and restaurants), I (Transport, storage, and communication), J 
(Financial intermediation) and K (Real estate, renting, and business activities). Data sourced from Eurostat 
NewCronos database; data are for 2003Q2. 
19 NACE 2D-72, which includes hardware consultancy, software consultancy and supply, data processing, 
database activities, maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computer machinery, and other computer 
related services. Note that these data are classified by sector of the economy, rather than the Forrester data, 
which are classified by occupational type, i.e., across the entire economy.   7
subject to the broader business cycle, which in Europe has been decisively weak since 2002, likely 
depressing sectoral employment growth.  
  For the European manufacturing sector, no widely circulated explicit job loss number exists, 
and the distinction between FDI serving a foreign market and offshoring and offshore outsourcing 
must again be emphasized. Similarly, the new EU member states have recently benefited from much 
manufacturing offshoring and offshore outsourcing from the EU-15, particularly in the car industry, 
so the impact on the EU-25 is complex to describe.20 Based on a survey of large EU-15 
manufacturers, KPMG (2004) describes how the share of manufacturing carried out within the EU-
15 is expected to decline by 6 percentage points from mid-2004 to 42 percent in mid-2007, with 
China and Eastern Europe the main beneficiaries of new investment. On the other hand, the EU-15 
today enjoys a large trade surplus with the rest of the world in manufactured goods. Table 1, which is 
based on the 13 EU member states for which data were immediately available, shows that the extra-
EU-13 trade surplus rose rapidly by €41 billion from 2000 to 2003, when it stood at €33 billion―an 
accomplishment (especially seen from the United States) considering that the euro rose by a trade-
weighted 16 percent from 2000 to 2003.21 Using data from the UN ComTrade database from which 
individual EU member state extra-EU manufactured goods trade deficits can be calculated for the 
period, it becomes clear that very large differences exist among the EU-13. Overall, the improvement 
in the extra-EU-13 trade balance did not occur due to a collapse in imports, although this was the 
driving reason in Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The striking feature of table 
1 is that it illustrates that the vast majority of the improvement in EU-13 manufactured goods trade 
can be attributed to German export success. Yet, it is at the same time highly probable that income 
effects from the rise in the euro cut the other way and contributed to the stagnation in EU-13 
imports of manufactured goods. 
Table 1 points to continued competitive strength of the EU-13 in manufactured goods,22 so 
while some manufacturing capacity will flow out of the EU-15 in coming years, talks of imminent 
total deindustrialization, especially in Germany, must be dismissed. Indeed, the German Ministry of 
Industry and Work (BMWA 2004) shows value-added from German exports rising as a share of total 
German value-added, despite a rising share of intermediate imports in German exports. This 
indicates two things: first that rising intermediate imports seem to have helped German export 
                                                 
20 Eurostat (2004) reports that EU-15 manufacturing employment declined by 1.4 percent a year from 2000 to 
2003, thus mirroring the decline seen in the United States. At 18.6 percent of total employment, this sector, 
though, remains larger than in the United States. 
21 Manufactured goods defined as SITC categories 6 “Manufactured Goods,” 7 “Machinery and transportation 
equipment,” and 8 “Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles.” Data are from UN ComTrade database. Exchange 
rate data are from the ECB’s daily nominal effective exchange rate, available at 
www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/effective/html/index.en.html#data (accessed October 27, 2004). 
22 See also KPMG (2004).   8
performance, and second that Germany as a whole is benefiting from these rising exports. In short, 
from its increased use of imported intermediate goods, Germany is already reaping some of the 
benefits from offshoring, offshore outsourcing, and globalization in general, through improved 
competitiveness, rising exports, and creation of higher domestic value-added. 
A different approach to determining the true extent of offshoring and offshore outsourcing 
in Europe in the absence of valid official statistical data is to rely on surveys of media reporting of 
the phenomenon. While this approach obviously depends crucially on the questionable assumption 
of complete press coverage, it does have the advantage that it relies on broadly verifiable public 
sources. This stands in contrast to the reports of industry experts and consultants, which rely almost 
exclusively on unpublished interviews with corporate executives and frequently employ rather 
opaque methodologies. Two slightly different methods can be identified: scanning news media either 
for reports of all types of corporate restructuring, regardless of its type and cause, or only for reports 
on offshoring and offshore outsourcing related to corporate restructuring. The former method has 
the advantage of allowing comparisons of the relative importance of different causes of corporate 
restructuring―i.e., seeing if, for instance, people are being laid off due to corporate bankruptcies 
rather than offshoring and offshore outsourcing.23 On the other hand, it is clearly very resource-
demanding to cover all types of corporate restructuring, and therefore the threshold for inclusion 
into the “sample of restructurings” will frequently be put so high, say at 50 or 100 layoffs, that much 
valuable information of smaller restructurings is lost.24 This means that the hard number for lay-offs 
caused by, for instance, offshoring and offshore outsourcing from this broad type of media survey 
will likely be an underestimate.  
The European Monitor Center on Change runs the European Restructuring Monitor 
(ERM), which carries out this sort of wide-ranging media surveillance in order to gauge the intensity 
and nature of corporate restructuring in Europe.25 Its findings from the start of 2002 until February 
12, 2005, are presented in table 2.26 
                                                 
23 If corporate bankruptcies and aggregate demand were the major problems, clearly the policy response to the 
rising unemployment would include other measures than if it were mostly related to offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing. 
24 Such thresholds may also dangerously bias the sample towards “big events,” such as bankruptcies or plant 
closures (internal restructurings), which will tend to pass a high threshold in terms of lay-offs, whereas smaller-
scale events, say the offshoring of part of the 50-employee company back-office, may not. 
25 Available at www.erm.emcc.eurofound.eu.int/erm/index.php?template=home. See Kirkegaard (2004) and 
European Commission (2004) for examples of use of ERM data in discussions of offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing in Europe. 
26 ERM defines outsourcing as “a type of restructuring where the key activity is subcontracted to another 
company, which may or may not be located within the European Union.” This definition does not separate 
outsourcing and offshoring and may therefore cover more cases than are the focus of this working paper. ERM 
defines relocation as “where the activity is relocated to another country of the European Union or beyond its 
borders.” All such relocations are thus included in the focus of this working paper.   9
Table 2 suggests that as a reason for corporate restructuring in Europe, “outsourcing” and 
“relocation abroad” are of relatively limited importance―at about 7 percent of total jobs lost.27 The 
ERM covers the daily and business press in the EU-15 and records European corporate restructuring 
that affects at least one EU-15 country, entails the announced or actual destruction of at least 100 
jobs, or involves at least 10 percent of the workforce at sites employing more than 250 people―in 
other words, the threshold for inclusion is relatively high. Hence, the ERM will likely underestimate 
the true number of jobs lost and may also skew the relative importance of outsourcing/relocation vs. 
generally “larger lay-off events” arising from bankruptcies or restructurings downward. 
  Another recent media survey of European economies, which covers offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing, is found in Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004). The authors track cases of “production 
shifts” globally from January 1 to March 31, 2004, using a variety of news databases―i.e., their study 
is of the second, more focused type, which tracks only one particular type of restructuring and 
therefore will probably be more comprehensive. Their study focuses on the United States and the 
role of China but contains valuable information about European countries, too. The findings for 
production shifts out of Europe are summarized in table 3: The difference between Bronfenbrenner 
and Luce (2004) and the ERM data for the same period is striking. Table 4 presents ERM statistics 
for January 1–April 1, 2004. 
Bronfenbrenner and Luce surveyed English-language news media for shifts to Asia and 
Latin America and note that they therefore will likely have underreported production shifts from 
non-English speaking European countries and particularly production shifts from Western to 
Eastern Europe. On the other hand, they, unlike ERM, did not have any lower threshold for the size 
of job losses to be included in their sample. Both media surveys cover all sectors of the economy, but 
Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004) also include Eastern European countries, Norway, and Switzerland 
in their definition of Europe. Nonetheless, Bronfenbrenner and Luce detect 119 more instances of 
“production shifts” than does ERM of “outsourcing” and “relocation abroad” in the first quarter of 
2004, with more than 12 times the reported jobs lost! Yet, based on average sizes, the vast majority 
of Bronfenbrenner and Luce’s detected cases of “production shifts” should pass the “100 jobs lost 
threshold” for inclusion in the ERM database. Annualizing their first quarter data, Bronfenbrenner 
and Luce’s number of total jobs lost to offshoring and offshore outsourcing (production shifts) for 
the entire year of 2004 in Europe would approximate 160,000 jobs, thus ignoring their self-professed 
                                                 
27 This corresponds relatively closely with the US Department of Labor’s Mass Layoff Statistics, which tracks 
sustained US lay-offs of more than 50 people. Here, overseas relocations and import competition are 
responsible for only about 2 to 4 percent of jobs lost. See BLS news releases “Extended Mass Layoffs 
Associated with Domestic and Overseas Relocations” at www.bls.gov/news.release/reloc.toc.htm, and Baily 
and Lawrence (2004) on trade in general as a minor cause for job losses in US manufacturing.  10
likely underreporting. This equals 0.14 percent of the 116 million privately employed people in the 
EU-15 in 2003.28  
  Taking the Bronfenbrenner and Luce study as “objective truth” is obviously untenable. For 
instance, their inclusion of Eastern European countries in “Europe” may skew their numbers 
upwards, as production shifts from here to, say, China. Yet in their study they have used an extensive 
number of professional news and media databases, such as Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, Dun and Bradstreet, 
Business Source Premier, ISI Emerging Markets, and ABI-Inform. Access to these databases is very 
expensive, but on the other hand they provide very broad media coverage. Evidently, there is a risk 
of double counting when searching multiple databases, but the authors’ methodology also utilizes 
company-specific data and thus registers only entry per company production shift. According to 
ERM’s Web site,29 their data are instead collected by a network of economists, sociologists, or 
journalists specialized in industrial relations, relying on major national newspapers and company and 
trade union Web sites. This indicates that Bronfenbrenner and Luce had access to more resources 
than does ERM and that the big difference in detected cases suggests that the ERM very significantly 
underestimates the scope in Europe of outsourcing and relocations abroad. This further indicates 
that for the ERM database, which is funded by the European Commission, to reflect the true scope 
of offshoring and offshore outsourcing in Europe and hence be of value to policymakers in the 
debate on the subject, it needs a substantial increase in the resources available to it. 
  The result one ends up with when attempting to gauge the present extent of offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing in Europe is that any sense of imminent doom for Europe’s labor markets 
because of offshoring and offshore outsourcing is unwarranted, even if one relies on the highest job 
loss estimates available. Similar to the case in the United States, the shares of jobs are very small, 
particularly compared with the 14.3 million total unemployed in the EU-15 in 2003. About 81,000 IT 
and services jobs out of a total of 56.7 million so far, rising to (conservative estimate) 160,000 out of 
116 million for the total private economy in 2004 alone have migrated outside the European Union. 
The important question, however, is not whether this migration will continue―it will―but who will 




                                                 
28 116 million equals total employment with NACE categories “L” (Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security), “M” (Education), “L” (Health and social work), “O” (Other community, social, 
personal service activities), “P” (Activities of households), and “Q” (Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
subtracted). All these are generally sectors of the economy that are publicly managed in the EU-15. Britain is a 
partial exception in education. Data are for Q2 2003 from Eurostat NewCronos database. 
29 ERM sourcing available at www.erm.emcc.eurofound.eu.int/erm/index.php?template=help2.   11
 
III. WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES? 
 
Today, offshoring and offshore outsourcing generates more trade, frequently in new types of inputs 
and in new sectors. We know from theory and empirical studies that trade generates wealth, but we 
also know that trade generates both winners and losers. The question is who they will be in Europe. 
Before considering that, however, it is important to note that offshoring and offshore outsourcing 
will clearly increase world welfare, even if it imposes some costs on particular segments of the 
European economy. 
Starting with the assumption/assertion that the decision to offshore or offshore outsource a 
task by a company (or government) is implemented in a successful way, both winners and losers may 
be identified a priori. It is, however, crucial to emphasize that legally and technically possible 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing does not mean it will be profitable. There may be many reasons 
why such a decision is not profitable in all instances. Customers may not like to be served by call-
centers overseas, companies may not receive the intermediate goods in the required quality at the 
specified time, cultural misunderstandings may occur between companies and clients or across 
international borders, or proprietary information may be leaked to competitors.  
The particular benefits from offshore outsourcing and offshoring will vary from company to 
company and will frequently only be realized after a number of “trials and errors.”30 For instance, the 
most recent PWC Management Barometer Survey (PWC 2004) indicates that less than half of the 
European companies that have outsourced their financial functions have so far actually realized large 
savings, yet two-thirds of the same companies see offshored and offshore outsourced functions as 
very important to their profitable growth in the next two years. That so many companies see 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing as important for future profits, despite their initially 
disappointing savings, indicates that companies foresee a steep learning curve and expect to 
eventually realize the potential savings. 
Keeping the assertion of potential profitability in mind, there are three certain European 
winners, namely companies engaging in outsourcing and offshoring, countries that supply offshored 
                                                 
30 See, for instance, Financial Times, “How to tap the opportunities for outsourcing,” August 25, 2004, p. 7; 
“Fresh set of management skills is needed,” September 27, 2004; Special Report: Risk Management, “Move to 
reduce costs can also lose customers”, June 2, 2004, on what individual managers should consider in order to 
achieve cost-effective offshore outsourcing. The example of Dell Computers, which in late 2003 following 
complaints from customers shifted technical support for two of its computer models back to the United States 
after an initial offshoring to India is a highly publicized case of possible, but ultimately not profitable, 
offshoring. See CNET News.com, “Dell drops some tech calls to India” November 24, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/Dell+drops+some+tech+calls+to+India/2100-7342_3-5110933.html?tag=nl (accessed 
November 24, 2004).  12
and offshore outsourced production and services, and consumers of such products and services. 
Two assured European losers are workers who lose their jobs and companies that are unable to 
adopt best-industry practices through offshoring or offshore outsourcing. And then there is the big 
unknown―namely whether European countries whose companies carry out offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing and whose residents consume offshored and offshore outsourced goods and services 
(but also may lose their jobs) will be better or worse off. This, it will be argued below, depends 




European companies engaging in offshoring and offshore outsourcing. These get 
access to potentially very large cost savings, mostly arising from lower labor costs.31 Savings will vary 
from industry to industry and country to country, but most industry expert estimates range between 
30 and 60 percent.32 In the longer term, these companies will also gain access to new pools of highly 
skilled labor, both directly through their own offshored facilities and indirectly through offshore 
outsourcing from local suppliers. Furthermore, for companies located in European countries with 
very inflexible labor markets, offshore locations generally will allow a more flexible management of 
their workforce levels.33 As offshoring and offshore outsourcing entails the application of modern 
management techniques and a large capital stock in a low-wage labor setting, the traditional close 
relationship between wages and productivity is loosened in the short and medium terms. Hence, 
companies that engage in offshoring and offshore outsourcing in total stand to gain significant 
productivity improvements.34  
It is, however, worth emphasizing that companies that view offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing as merely a one-off cost-cutting measure and do not attempt to utilize new inputs to 
create wholly new products and services are unlikely to reap the longer-term benefits available from 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing. Development of new markets may also very well start with the 
                                                 
31 Lower capital investment requirements are another potential cost saver for companies choosing to locate a 
new facility offshore, rather than expand in their home market. Such “balance-sheet savings” will be one-off 
but may be substantial in term of the total return on invested capital. 
32 See McKinsey (2003, 2004), BCG (2004), Deloitte Research (2004), and PWC (2004). Most of these estimates 
relate to savings for US companies, and McKinsey (2004) suggests that European companies may realize 
slightly lower savings, as they face bigger hurdles in laying off workers and restructuring their domestic 
businesses than do US firms. Hence, while European firms may have generally higher labor costs than US firms 
and thus ought to be able to realize higher savings, structural impediments in the European labor market 
prevent this from happening. 
33 See comments by Dieter Mankowski, head of the German Chamber of Commerce, in “Czech Wages are 
Strong Draw,” Financial Times, July 23, 2004, p. 11. 
34 There is a large literature on the superior productivity of multinational companies, relative to purely domestic 
companies; see excellent overview in Lewis and Richardson (2001).  13
location of an offshore facility there. Such local production facilities can allow European companies 
to hit the local “price-point”―i.e., produce goods and services at prices that make sales in low-wage 
countries possible.35 
 
European countries that supply offshored and offshore outsourced production 
and services.36 With the accession of the 10 new member states in May 2004, the European 
Union now contains several large suppliers of offshored and offshore outsourced products and 
services. However, some EU-15 countries, especially Ireland, have also benefited as “offshore 
production locations.”37 Supplying countries’ benefits are straightforward: In the short term benefits 
are in terms of the jobs generated and the investment attracted, and those in the longer term are in 
terms of the technology and skill transfers to local populations that accompany offshore and 
offshore outsourcing decisions by companies.  
Consumers of offshored and offshore outsourced production and services. 
Ultimate consumers (i.e., individuals, not just companies) of offshored goods and services will 
benefit from lower prices of the items they consume. Mann (2003), for instance, estimates that 
between 10 and 30 percent of the price decline in semiconductors and memory chips during the 
1990s occurred because of the globalization of the IT hardware industry. Consumers may also 
benefit from expanded business hours in many services industries―i.e., the opportunity to call a 
company call-center in Bangalore after 5pm GMT/CET. Price declines will, depending on the extent 
of offshoring and offshore outsourcing relative to the total, drive inflation lower and thereby lead to 
higher real wages. This serves furthermore as a “redistributive tool” between company profits and 




European workers who lose their jobs because of offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing. Workers who lose their jobs as a consequence of offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing are the obvious and immediate losers. It is important to appreciate that similar to other 
types of international trade, those who lose their jobs are a small and concentrated group hit hard, 
                                                 
35 For the case of the US IT hardware industry hitting the “local price point,” see Mann (forthcoming). 
36 This refers only to European countries but clearly is equally true for supplying countries outside Europe. 
37 Ireland’s position as an offshore location for both goods and services production by US technology 
companies is well known, but Roland Berger/UNCTAD (2004) indicates that 29 percent of offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing projects by European companies remains within the EU-15 (+ EEA), also benefiting 
countries like Britain, Spain, and Portugal.   14
relative to the much more numerous and diverse group of winners from offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing, who (with the possible exception of companies) will all benefit only relatively little 
individually. This asymmetry between winners and losers makes the political economy of offshoring 
and outsourcing identical to most other discussions of free trade and import competition (Lewis and 
Richardson 2001). 
 
European companies unable to adopt “best practices” through offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing. This frequently overlooked group of European losers from offshoring 
and offshore outsourcing is nonetheless very important because one of the fundamental problems 
plaguing Europe today is low productivity growth. As globalization accelerates, for more and more 
industries offshoring and offshore outsourcing strategies are no longer merely an option; they are 
already a competitive imperative for companies.38 This means that European companies unable to 
restructure their operations with the use of offshoring and offshore outsourcing of particular 
intermediate inputs or tasks will be at a competitive disadvantage against both their non-EU 
competitors and EU competitors able to do so. As the circumstances of individual companies are 
highly disparate, and experiences thus rarely directly transferable between companies, this holds true, 
even if offshoring companies are faced with a “learning curve” and first movers don’t always get it 
immediately right.  European companies will face slower growth and may ultimately either be driven 
completely from the marketplace through bankruptcy or voluntary market withdrawal or choose to 
relocate their entire production (or as much as possible) outside their countries of origin―in both 
cases likely with larger job losses occurring than if offshoring and offshore outsourcing had been 
possible at an earlier stage.  
 
Winners or Losers 
 
European countries, whose companies engage in offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing and whose residents consume offshore and offshore outsourced 
goods and services. Obviously, whether European countries emerge as winners or losers from 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing depends on whether they can create more winners than losers 
and whether they can turn losers into winners. The answer to this question is still uncertain and will 
be the focus of the remainder of this working paper.  
 
                                                 
38 See BCG (2004). Roland Berger/UNCTAD (2004) cites a representative survey of Europe’s top 500 
companies in which 47 percent of companies are guided by competitors’ best-practice examples when deciding 
upon a destination for service-sector offshoring and offshore outsourcing.  15
 
IV.  WHAT MIGHT PREVENT EUROPE FROM BENEFITING FROM 
OFFSHORING AND OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING AND SOLVING ITS LOW 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS? 
 
Offshoring and offshore outsourcing are an integral part of competitive business in the 21st century, 
and a Europe focused on economic growth, social sustainability, and competitiveness cannot avoid 
its consequences. Therefore, Europe needs to direct its policies toward managing the consequences 
of the phenomenon rather than attempting to block it. Europe needs to create winners rather than 
losers, and turn losers into winners. Unfortunately, studies show that this may not be happening at 




Two studies of service-sector offshoring and offshore outsourcing by the McKinsey Global Institute 
(MGI) on the benefits to the United States and Germany, respectively, reach starkly different 
conclusions. MGI (2003) estimates that the US economy benefits by a net $1.14 for every $1 of 
services production offshored or offshore outsourced to India―i.e., it is a net winner. More than 40 
percent of the total gain to the US economy comes from reemployment of laid-off US workers in the 
United States. In contrast, MGI (2004) estimates that the German economy on aggregate loses €0.20 
for every €1 of services offshored or offshore outsourced, with a gain of only €0.29 per euro from 
reemployed labor. The two studies39 clearly point to the single most crucial issue that will prevent 
European economies from benefiting from offshoring and outsourcing―Europe’s very low 
reemployment rate for laid-off workers. In order for Europe to achieve a net gain from offshoring 
and offshore outsourcing, European governments must take on the important task of ameliorating 
the losses of laid-off workers―the group most adversely affected by offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing―and productively reemploying them in the economy. 
Institute Senior Fellow Lori Kletzer estimated that 65 percent of displaced (laid-off) US 
manufacturing workers and 69 percent of nonmanufacturing workers find employment again shortly 
after being laid off (Kletzer 2001, 31).40 More recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show 
                                                 
39 A direct comparison between the two studies is made complicated by the fact that the US study refers to only 
production offshored or offshore outsourced to India (i.e., a bilateral relationship), whereas the German study 
refers to German services offshored or offshore outsourced both to India and Eastern Europe, where savings 
are lower.  
40 Kletzer’s data source, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ “Displaced Worker Survey” reports time of 
reemployment only as at the time of surveying, so cannot be immediately used to gauge the duration of the 
unemployment spell. Lori Kletzer’s data are used by the MGI for their study of the United States.   16
that the share of permanent job losers in the United States who found new employment within 14 
weeks of becoming unemployed in 2002–03 was 59.4 percent, while the share of permanent job 
losers without employment after more than six months was only 21.3 percent.41 Estimates for 
European reemployment rates for displaced workers are not immediately comparable with US data,42 
but empirical studies have pointed to the apparent trade-off in Europe between smaller wage losses 
than in the United States and higher risk of long-term unemployment. Burda and Mertens (2001) find 
that in Germany, up to 20 percent of displaced workers are unemployed even after four years of 
being initially laid off.43  
Based on a comparison (figure 1) of the average duration of US and European 
unemployment spells, it becomes clear that laid-off European workers on average face significantly 
longer spells of unemployment than do workers in the United States. For some Europeans, this is, 
however, undoubtedly voluntary, because of the higher levels of unemployment benefits. OECD 
(2002, table 3.10) estimates that on average, net replacement rates for unemployment benefits across 
family types and earnings levels long unemployment spells (60 months) in the EU-15 at 60 percent 
are twice the level of 32 percent in the United States.  
Not only do the majority of European countries have much higher unemployment than does 
the United States but also unemployed Europeans remain unemployed far longer than do Americans. 
Palpably, if European labor markets create long-term unemployed out of workers who lose their jobs 
due to offshoring and offshore outsourcing, then this will prevent such countries from benefiting 
from offshoring and offshore outsourcing, as workers are not productively reemployed in the 
economy. 
In many of Europe’s large industrial restructurings,44 early retirement has been used as a tool 
to provide a social cushion for workers. This leads to permanent inactivity, which from the 
perspective of the worker may be advantageous, but clearly for European countries already suffering 
from low labor utilization (especially among older workers) and mounting fiscal deficits is the worst 
possible outcome. Early retirement granted to people without appropriate health problems but 
principally to combat unemployment is of particular concern in relation to offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing. Offshoring and offshore outsourcing frequently may result in closure of entire 
production facilities in Europe. This puts not just recent hires but also other peripheral groups on the 
                                                 
41 Historical data for table A-33 from the BLS CPS survey available at www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm#data 
(accessed November 2, 2004). 
42 This is due to the differences in methodologies in the statistical data material available. Surveys differ in such 
areas as sectoral coverage, occupational coverage, and time dimensions. 
43 See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). 
44 For instance, the restructuring of Renault in the 1990s, which included the closing of the Vilvorde plant near 
Brussels, saw workers down to the age of 48 receiving early retirement pensions. See Baily and Kirkegaard 
(2004).  17
labor market, such as women, young people, and older workers―where, as can be seen in table 5, 
Europe’s low employment problem is concentrated―at risk. Also, many prime age male (25 to 54 
years) traditional “insiders” in the labor market may be affected. If this group, which as can be seen 
in table 5 also enjoys very high employment rates of around 85 percent in Europe and which 
possesses a larger political voice than do the more marginal groups, were to increasingly receive early 
retirement following job losses related to offshoring and offshore outsourcing, it would certainly ruin 
Europe’s attempts at raising its overall labor input, as well as preventing it from becoming a net 




An additional frequently overlooked aspect of Europe’s high unemployment is that it is highly 
unevenly distributed. In 2003, unemployment among EU-15 countries ranged between 3.7 percent in 
Luxembourg to 11.3 percent in Spain. Given the different product- and labor-market regulations, 
languages, and historical experiences across Europe, it is not surprising that large differences exist 
between EU-15 countries.45  
However, much more damaging are the even bigger differences in unemployment rates 
within individual European countries. It is somewhat ironic that a lot of discussion has taken place 
with respect to the optimality of the eurozone as a currency area, when indeed the case can be made 
that the regional differences within individual eurozone member states―the currency areas being 
replaced by the eurozone―with respect to labor mobility are larger than between them. Eurostat 
collects data for three European subnational regions in the so-called NUTS system.46 NUTS level 1 
covers regions of an average size between 3 million and 7 million inhabitants, NUTS level 2 from 
800,000 to 3 million inhabitants, and NUTS level 3 from 150,000 to 800,000 inhabitants. 
  As can be seen in figure 2, which is ranked by OECD standardized unemployment averages, 
unemployment rates vary much more within EU-15 countries than between them. In Italy, for 
instance, the domestic range is more than 20 percentage points. Several other things are also 
illuminated in figure 2. All six EU-15 countries that in 2003 had a lower unemployment rate than the 
United States also had a low standard deviation in the regional percentage differences in 
unemployment rates (2 or less). What this indicates is that the countries in Europe with low overall 
unemployment do not have very large differences in unemployment rates between regions. On the 
other hand, the very high standard deviations of regional differences of unemployment rates in high-
                                                 
45 See Baily and Kirkegaard (2004) for an elaboration of the crucial national differences between EU-15 states. 
46 The French acronym for Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units.  See Eurostat (2003) for more 
information.  18
unemployment EU-15 countries indicate large regional differences. That is to say France, Germany, 
and Italy do not have 8 to 10 percent unemployment in every region: Unemployment in some 
regions in these countries is very high, while in others it is low. Indeed, all European countries except 
France and Greece had regions with lower unemployment in 2003 than the US average. It is the 
archipelago of very high unemployment regions in Europe that gives the continent its overall 
unemployment problem.  
  It furthermore seems that even very high unemployment rates is a very poor predictor of 
internal migration in Europe. Figures 3 and 4 plot recent multiyear net changes in the labor force (15 
years and above, employed or unemployed) in those European regions with more than 15 percent 
unemployment and a 50 percent share of long-term unemployment, respectively. Contrary to what 
economic logic would predict, there is no uniform large-scale emigration from these depressed areas. 
Europeans apparently do not consider high unemployment locally as a sufficient incentive to move 
to another region within their country. 
In fact, as can be seen in figures 3 and 4, in regions with either very high unemployment or 
high long-term unemployment, labor force growth is slightly positively correlated with the degree of 
unemployment. It goes without saying that a system sustaining such an archipelago of very high 
unemployment regions, without apparently providing appropriate incentives for the unemployed to 
move to more dynamic regions, is very ill suited to provide people being laid off due to offshoring or 
offshore outsourcing with better reemployment opportunities.  
And the number of Europeans affected is far from negligible. In 2003, a labor force of more 
than 19 million people, or 11 percent of the total labor force in the EU-15, lived in regions (NUTS 
level 2 or 3) with more than 15 percent unemployment. This is compared with the less than 1 million 
Americans in total, or 0.34 percent of the total US population, who in 2003 lived in counties with 15 
percent or more unemployment.47  
 
Companies Unable to Restructure 
 
Due to geopolitical events and new promarket policies, the period since the late 1980s has been 
characterized by the increasing integration of close to 2.5 billion people from China, India, and the 
former Soviet Union into the world economy,48 many millions of whom are highly skilled 
professionals. Combined with the rapid technological development described above, this “one-off” 
                                                 
47 Bureau of Labor Statistics data available at www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm (accessed November 25, 2004). 
Statistics for the US labor force at the county level were not immediately available. 
48 United Nations, Population and Vital Statistics Report, 2004, available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/popsize/size2.htm (accessed November 6, 2004).   19
has changed the competitive landscape facing European and other companies to a degree arguably 
unlike any in postwar history. Hence, the premium available for flexible European companies with 
the ability to restructure is higher today than earlier. This makes the need to facilitate flexibility for 
companies correspondingly more urgent than in earlier periods. 
From the perspective of companies, offshoring and offshore outsourcing are akin to an 
organizational change, a restructuring of their businesses to improve competitiveness. Restructurings 
are accompanied by both the creation and destruction of jobs, and it is crucial for companies to 
continuously restructure to remain competitive and adopt new technologies. Figure 5 indicates the 
rate of job turnover (job creations from expansions plus job destructions from contractions, firm 
births and deaths excluded) in existing companies in European countries during different periods in 
the 1990s. As can be seen, there are differences between countries, but when compared with the total 
job turnover rate in the United States, which from 1993 to 2001 was an average 12.6 percent per 
quarter, it is evident that the rate of restructuring (creative destruction) in European firms is lower 
than in the United States.49 
Inability to restructure European businesses may arise from many different reasons,50 but the 
biggest obstacle by far is the inflexibility of many of Europe’s labor markets, where many layers of 
employment protection legislation and likely court interferences prevent lay-offs and thus ultimately 
new hiring of workers. As presented in table 6, employment protection legislation in most, especially 
large continental, European countries is very tight, and as table 7 lays out, companies in many 
European countries face numerous and frequently lengthy court battles to lay off workers following a 
restructuring.51 
                                                 
49 US data for expansions and contractions in the total private economy are from the BLS Business 
Employment Dynamics Database at www.bls.gov/bdm/home.htm. A firm word of caution on a too direct 
comparison of the US and European data sources: The European data are firm-level, while the US data are 
establishment-level. Firm-level job flows understate the actual magnitude of gross job flows among plants 
(Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti 2004, 473), thus the European data are relatively biased downward. 
Secondly, the European data have a threshold for inclusion biased against small firms, whereas the US data 
include all sizes of firms. As employment in small (and young) firms and establishments will fluctuate more 
than that in larger (and older) firms (Khan 2002), this too relatively biases the European data downward. The 
exclusion of both newly started and closing companies somewhat mitigates this effect. Finally, it is important to 
realize that annual job turnover rates are not simply equal to four times the quarterly rate. Issues of 
establishment splits and consolidations and ownership changes make such simple “annual sums of quarterly 
rates” misleading. See OECD (1994) for elaboration. However, several studies of US annual flows point toward 
annual job turnover rates of close to 20 percent. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) calculate 19.4 percent 
annually from 1973 to 1988 in US manufacturing with a sample excluding companies with less than five 
employees. Pinkston and Spletzer (2001) calculate 19.7 percent for expansions and contractions in California 
from 1999 to 2000, and Spletzer (2000) calculates 16.7 percent for West Virginia’s expansions and contractions 
from 1990 to 1994. 
50 See Baily and Kirkegaard (2004) for elaboration. 
51 For the importance of judicial interference in employment protection in France, see also Blanchard and 
Tirole (2003).  20
Uncertainty, more than the economic costs themselves, is the most detrimental aspect of 
large-scale legal institution involvement in labor-market issues. The risk of having a labor court 
suddenly overturn announced lay-offs makes financial planning of potential business expansions 
much more difficult, as maximum potential costs cannot be gauged in advance. This inevitably 
dampens business risk appetite for expansions and adversely affects job creation. 
  
V. EUROPE’S  NECESSARY POLICY RESPONSE  
 
As laid out in Baily and Kirkegaard (2004), Europe today faces a number of interrelated economic 
challenges. Fortunately, rising to the particular challenge of offshoring and offshore outsourcing not 
only addresses a topic of increasing political importance but also holds part of the solution to 
Europe’s two overarching problems of low productivity growth and low labor input. It is essential 
that European public anxiety regarding offshoring and offshore outsourcing and accompanying 
potential political action be utilized to push for the right structural reforms in Europe―not to 
promote further restrictions on trade and businesses.52 
  So, what are the right structural reforms to deal with this issue? In section III, we saw how 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing create winners in the form of European companies that achieve 
lower costs and higher productivity and European consumers who get lower prices and higher real 
wages. At the same time, European workers who lose their jobs and European companies that 
cannot realize the benefits of offshoring and offshore outsourcing lose out. From section IV it is 
clear that Europe’s overwhelming lack of labor-market flexibility creates such losers―laid-off 
workers are less likely to find new employment and companies less likely to restructure. To benefit 
from offshoring and offshore outsourcing, Europe therefore first and foremost needs to increase the 
flexibility of its labor markets. 
  Auspiciously, such reforms are already part of the Lisbon Agenda. The 2003 EU 
Employment Guidelines adopted by the European Council states that member states shall implement 
the following policies: 
                                                 
52 High labor costs in Europe have in recent decades led to highly capital-intensive production, especially in 
manufacturing. Thus the issue of labor-to-capital substitution is less of a concern in Europe than in the United 
States, for instance. Yet, it is important to realize that the true counterfactual to a job kept in Europe, due to 
constraints on companies’ ability to restructure, is not a job kept in Europe perpetually. Instead, especially in 
the services sectors, it is probably a job lost to automation―the cheapest labor of all. US estimates of the costs 
of call-centers indicate that the cost to a company of a fully automated call handled by a computer is as low as 
$.50, as opposed to $7 to talk to a real person. The magnitude of the cost difference should cause most 
companies to move toward computer-handled call-centers. However, surveys indicate that customer 
satisfaction with services provided by a computer is much lower than phone calls handled by a person. See 
USA Today, “An Automated Call Costs Less Than 50 Cents vs. $7 to Talk to a Real Person”, September 26, 
2003, p. 1a.  21
 
  “…review, and where appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in 
employment legislation that affect labour market dynamics…”53 
 
  Similarly, the Report of the Employment Task Force, chaired by Wim Kok (2003), reads on 
page 28: 
 
  “…Member States should assess and where necessary alter the level of flexibility 
provided in standard [unlimited duration] contracts, in areas such as periods of 
notice, costs and procedures for individual or collective dismissal, or the 
definition of unfair dismissal.”  
 
  In other words, the need for increased labor-market flexibility is not exactly news to 
European decision makers. It is, however, critical to emphasize that offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing add further to the urgency and “appropriateness” of this particular type of reforms. The 
approach to labor-market reforms taken so far by several European governments of introducing new 
flexibility simply on the periphery of European labor markets―by conceiving new types of 
employment contracts while still protecting the core standard contracts―will no longer suffice.54 
Handling offshoring and offshore outsourcing requires increased flexibility throughout the labor 
market. 
  European policymakers should take comfort in IMF estimates by Amiti and Wei (2004) on 
service-sector job growth in Britain and the United States, the two countries most affected by 
offshoring and offshore outsourcing in the services sectors. Both countries have very flexible labor 
markets (table 6) and can in this respect be said to have already implemented the required parts of 
the EU Lisbon Agenda on labor-market flexibility. Amiti and Wei (2004, 18) conclude that their  
 
“…results suggest that service outsourcing not only would not induce a fall in 
aggregate employment, but also have the potential to make firms/sectors sufficiently 
more efficient, leading to enough job creation in the same sectors to offset the lost 
jobs due to outsourcing.” 
 
  Efforts such as the German Agenda 2010, which reduced the level and duration of available 
unemployment benefits, is a step in the right direction for Germany as it serves to increase the 
                                                 
53 Official Journal of the European Union L197/13, Council Decision of 22 July, 2003, on guidelines for the 
employment policies of the member states. 
54 This is the essence of recent years’ employment reforms in Italy (Biagi laws), France (the various contract 
forms of Contrats de Qualification [CDQ], Contrats Initiative Emploi [CIE], Emplois Jeune Contracts [EJC], 
Contrats Employs-Consolides [CEC], or Contrats Employ-Solidarity [CES]), Germany (Ich-AGs, Mini-jobs), 
and Spain (fixed term contracts introduced in the mid-1980s and new permanent contracts with lower firing 
costs for youth and older workers and the long-term unemployed in the mid-1990s).  22
incentives for seeking work and thus will raise labor supply. However, with offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing growing, flexibility is what spurs labor demand and creates new jobs. Thus, legal barriers 
to hiring and firing all types of workers must be brought down substantially, not just in Germany but 
also in almost every European country, in order for labor-market reforms to appropriately prepare 
Europe for the future of offshoring and offshore outsourcing. 
  Some might argue that increased labor-market flexibility flies in the face of the notions of 
“social Europe” and inevitably comes at the expense of workers and their health. However, as 
presented in sections III and IV, such arguments are rooted in misperceptions of the present 
situation in Europe. No society should claim to be truly socially cohesive, if—as is the case in, for 
instance, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, or Greece today—less than a third of young people under the 
age of 24 are attached to the labor market, only about half of all women are employed, and the 
majority of people above 55 are outside the labor market. Such a state is manifestly not socially 
cohesive and neither fair to future generations nor fiscally sustainable even in the short term―indeed 
it is the opposite. Similarly, as laid out above, many jobs are lost in Europe even today. The current 
system is thus trapping European workers between two stools. Faced with offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing and despite the best efforts of labor-market regulations in many countries, European 
workers neither have individual “job security” nor do they enjoy “the employment security” available 
in more liberal labor markets able to generate a large number of new jobs. In truth, it is thus the 
efforts to promote labor-market liberalization and boost productivity growth and job creation that 
should be labeled “social” in nature. 
A further key to a genuinely flexible labor market is a labor force equipped with the 
appropriate skills demanded, and providing workers with the opportunities to continuously upgrade 
their skills is fundamental to assisting laid-off workers in finding new jobs. Increased restructuring 
accompanying offshoring and offshore outsourcing in Europe puts renewed emphasis on the need 
for worker retraining, as also previously protected workers can expect to change jobs more frequently 
than in the past. As presented in figure 6, there are large differences between European countries in 
this area, with governments and businesses in the Netherlands and Denmark spending large sums of 
money on the subject while Southern European governments and businesses are spending less. 
Noticeably, Britain and the United States, with very flexible labor markets, are not heavy 
spenders in this area, and both countries would clearly benefit even more from offshoring and 
offshore outsourcing were they to channel more resources into it.  Europe, though, is generally well 
positioned with respect to worker retraining and the “Education and Training” part of the Lisbon 
Agenda, in which the European Council among other things gives priority to 
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 “…providing  opportunities to acquire and/or upgrade basic skills, including the 
new basic skills, such as IT skills, foreign languages, technological culture, 
entrepreneurship and social skills…”55 
 
This type of skill-upgrading provides an appropriate path of future improvement of the European 
labor force. The need to closely involve businesses in training efforts must be emphasized. The 
Austrian system of tax deductions to companies of up to 120 percent of training costs56 seems an 
excellent way of overcoming the risk of market failure, with companies unwilling to fund their 
employees’ training only to find them lured away by competitors. A similarly effective idea is the 
“Human Capital Investment Tax Credit,” proposed by Institute Senior Fellow Catherine Mann, 
where companies get tax deductions for investments in human capital, just as they currently do in the 
United States for investments in capital goods and research. 
  Finally, as also laid out in section IV, the governments of several EU-15 countries―Belgium, 
Finland, Italy, Germany, Greece, France, and Spain―need to urgently address their regional 
differences: European populations need to be incentivized to move geographically to more dynamic 
regions more willingly. Here, clearly a fundamental rethink of regional policies is called for. 
Considering the enormous transfers to the former Germany or the southern part of Italy over the 
years,57 which obviously have had very limited effects on unemployment or economic growth, it is 
evident that even unsustainably large public investments in certain regions cannot lift these out of 
stagnation. Palpably, jobs cannot simply be moved to where people live, so people must move to 
where the jobs are. At least two alternatives must be pursued. 
Less developed regions should be freed from national and EU-level labor-market legislation 
(of course it would be better if these were liberalized at the national level) on such areas as working 
time, minimum wages as well as hiring and firing restrictions. Local zoning regulations could also be 
covered by blanket exemptions. Such freedom would make local businesses in depressed regions 
more competitive, not unlike the very successful special economic zones in China, for instance. This 
will allow the reward ratio between work and inactivity to be set based on the local situation, rather 
than on national averages, which may not be appropriate for a particular region. This is of particular 
importance in eastern Germany, which is struggling under a system fine-tuned to West German 
conditions, as well as in southern Italy, where the national Italian labor market system is dictated by 
the conditions and requirements of the successful northern part of the country. 
Another way to refocus regional policy is to no longer target the land but the people living 
on the land. Instead of pouring money into public investments and job creation in declining regions, 
                                                 
55 European Council Resolution OJ C163/2002, June 27, 2002. 
56 Report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok (2003, 51). 
57 Transfers to eastern Germany alone accounts for more than €500 billion in the 1990s, and €156 billion more 
is scheduled until 2019, Baily and Kirkegaard (2004).  24
the money should be spent on assisting people in moving out of these regions. All European 
countries have dynamic regions with very low unemployment, so if people need to move there to 
find a job, governments should help them make this move, rather than continuously subsidizing their 
dwelling in areas with very low chances of finding employment. This means that such things as 
subsidized housing, traditionally available to unemployed families, should be made more conditional 
on willingness to move. Similarly, the requirement for the unemployed to move to a new location, in 
order to take up a vacant position there, must be tightened and rigorously enforced.58 Finally, the 
costs of moving―i.e., principally buying and selling real estate―must be brought down, as such costs 
might otherwise prohibit mobility. 
  Many of the same changes should be made to the EU regional aid system. In the summer of 
2004, the European Commission adopted its new proposals for EU regional policy reform from 
2007 to 2013.59 A total of €336 billion has been allocated for the period. Unfortunately almost 80 
percent of the budget continues to be earmarked to the underdeveloped and outermost regions,60 
with priority projects including infrastructure, transport networks, sustainable transport, renewable 
energy, and administrative capacity. No doubt the continuation of this policy of funding physical 
capital in stagnating and outlying regions will continue to be very politically expedient for both the 
EU Commission (which gets to hand out the money) and the EU Council (which gets some 
bargaining chips to distribute during political negotiations and common EU money to spend at 
home). Regrettably, however, what Europe needs most to deal with offshoring and offshore 
outsourcing is flexible, mobile human capital. The European Commission ought to focus a much 
bigger share of its regional aid than at present to generating human capital among the inhabitants of 
depressed and outlying regions and then facilitate its use in more dynamic regions of Europe.  
  The required regional efforts ought not involve transfers of massive financial resources but 
be concentrated in legislation and regulation aimed at scaling back legal barriers to economic growth. 
Money should indeed be spent but on retraining and skill-upgrading of people, rather than on regions 
with the lowest GDP. The goal of an EU “cohesion policy” should be to provide everybody with the 
skills to be employed and the opportunity to move to where the jobs are, rather than fund roads, 
bridges, and tunnels between locations that may no longer possess a future. Enlightened regional 
                                                 
58 See Baily and Kirkegaard (2004) for positive results in lowering the levels of structural unemployment with 
such policies of under the threat of losing unemployment benefits of “requiring the unemployed to move to 
take up a new job” in Denmark. 
59 Cohesion Policy: The 2007 Watershed. Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/reg2007_en.pdf (accessed 
November 27, 2004). 
60 Regions with either per capita GDP of <75 percent of the EU-25 average, <75 percent of EU-15, and >75 
percent of EU-25 or per capita GNI of <90 percent of the European Community average, depending on the 
particular program.  25
policy should not aim to simply keep regions on life support―it occasionally should aid their 
euthanasia. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Offshoring and offshore outsourcing is not a choice for Europe—it is a fact. Yet, it is an 
opportunity, rather than a threat. As this working paper has presented, it will generate both winners 
and losers among Europeans, but it is up to individual governments to ensure countries realize a net 
gain. Perhaps up to 2 percent of Europe’s service-sector employment and a similar minor share of 
manufacturing employment may be affected in the coming decade, so most ominous European 
employment predictions must be rejected. Only few reliable data are available to quantify the true 
extent of the trend, so increased official statistical efforts to gather relevant data must be advocated. 
For instance, efforts such as the European Commission–funded European Restructuring Monitor 
will assist policymaking and help inform the public. 
Fortunately, no new grand schemes or costly programs are required for European countries 
to become net beneficiaries from offshoring and offshore outsourcing, in terms of both productivity 
and employment. Instead, worries over the phenomenon should add new thrust to the 
implementation of the two parts of the existing Lisbon Agenda that deal with liberalization of 
Europe’s labor markets and opportunities for worker retraining and skill upgrading. Particular efforts 
must be made to lower the restrictions on hiring and firing workers and restrict the influence of the 
judicial branch in routine labor-market disputes. Finally, Europe needs to put its people over its land 
and focus on providing skills to people in stagnating regions, rather than build superfluous new 
infrastructure there. All Europe’s countries contain dynamic regions of low unemployment, and 
Europeans need to be encouraged to move there and search for jobs, rather than languish in 
perpetual unemployment in regions no longer economically viable and generating no employment 
opportunities. 
 Europe thus already has much of the right medication to gain from offshoring and offshore 
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Table 1   EU-13 member state change in extra-EU manufactured goods trade  
balance,  2000–03 (billions of euros)
 
 
Country  Rise in exports  Rise in imports 
Change in  
trade balance 
Austria  5.10  .94   4.15 
Belgium  – 2.50  – 1.84  – .66 
Denmark  .79  .57  .23 
Finland  – .35  – .62  .27 
France  – 6.48  – 10.28  3.81 
Germany  3.71  1.51  30.22 
Greece  .32  2.47  – 2.15 
Ireland  – 2.23  – 3.77  1.54 
Italy  2.76  2.37  .40 
Netherlands  – 4.77    – 5.75   .97 
Spain  1.71           4.90  – 3.20 
Sweden  .14    – 1.66  1.81 
United Kingdom  16.57         12.87  3.71 
 
Total EU-13  42.77           1.71  41.06 
 
Notes: No data are available for Portugal and Luxembourg, and Luxembourg is treated as a non-EU 
member. Manufactured goods are defined as SITC categories 6, 7 and 8. UN ComTrade  data are 
denominated in current US dollars but have been converted to euros using the annual period average 
exchange rates from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Non-euro members Denmark 
and Sweden are assumed to track the euro versus the US dollar, while the UK dollar-denominated 
data are  first converted into pounds and then into euros, again utilizing IFS annual averages. 
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Table 2   Planned EU-15 job reductions by type of restructuring,  
                January 2002–February 2005 
 
 
Type of restructuring 
Number of planned 
reductions 
Planned job reductions 
(percent) 
Internal restructuring  888,850  78.18 
Bankruptcy/closure 135,021 11.94 
Relocation (abroad)   54,307   4.80 
Merger/acquisition   32,511   2.88 
Outsourcing   23,960   2.12 
 







Table 3  Announced or reported production shifts out of Europe, 





Number of  
production shifts 
       Average Number of 
jobs lost per shift 
Total reported number 
of jobs lost 
China  55    280  12,589 
India 25  243 
b      6,075 
d 
Other Asia  17  399 
b      6,783 
d 
Latin America  8  162 
c      1,296 
d 
Eastern Europe  24                     560    13,440 
d 
Other countries  4  n.a.         n.a. 
Total               133  n.a.  40,183 
n.a. = not available 
 
a. Europe includes EU-25, as well as Norway and Switzerland. 
b. Average number for all shifts of production, regardless of place of origin. 
c. Average number for Latin America, excluding Mexico. 
d. Number of shifts multiplied by average. 
 
Source: Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004). 
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Table  4    Planned EU-15 job reductions by type of restructuring, 
                January 1–April 1, 2004 
 
Type of restructuring 
 








Internal restructuring  17,097  61.28  56 
Bankruptcy/closure   5,913  21.19  25 
Relocation   2,333  8.36  11 
Merger/acquisition  18,000  6.45    3 
Outsourcing       757  2.71    3 
 







Table 5     EU-15 employment rates, by sex and age group, 2003 (percent) 
 
Age 15–24  Age 25–54  Age 55–64 
Country  Total age, 
15–64  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Denmark  75  62  58  88  79  67  53 
Netherlands  74  69  67  90  74  57  32 
Sweden  73  40  42  85  82  71  66 
Britain  72  57  54  88  74  65  46 
Austria  69  55  47  91  79  40  22 
Finland  68  40  39  83  79  51  48 
Portugal  67  43  34  88  74  62  42 
Ireland  65  51  45  87  65  65  33 
Germany  65  45  43  84  72  48  31 
EU-15 average  64  43  37  87  68  52  32 
France  63  33  26  87  72  41  33 
Luxembourg
a  63  27  26  92  65  39  21 
Spain  60  39  28  86  57  59  23 
Belgium  60  30  25  85  68  38  19 
Greece  58  31  20  90  57  59  26 
Italy  56  30  21  87  55  43  19 
a.  Data are for 2003Q2. 
 
Source: European Commission (2004), Eurostat NewCronos Database. 
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Table 6   Structural labor and product market indicators, 2003 
 
Employment protection  
legislation indicator
a  Tax wedge




































France  2.5  3.6  2.1  2.1  48.3  40.1 
Germany  2.7  1.8  3.8  1.4  52.0  43.9 
Italy  1.8  2.1  4.9  2.3  45.3  40.9 
Spain  2.6  3.5  3.1  1.6  37.6  34.1 
Britain  1.1  0.3  2.9  0.5  31.1  23.9 
 
Australia  1.5  0.9  2.9  0.9  28.3  24.4 
Canada  1.3  0.3  2.9  1.5  32.4  29.1 
United States  0.2  0.2  2.9  1.0  29.4  23.2 
 
a.  0-6 Summary Index: 0 = most flexible, 6 = least flexible.  
 Source: OECD (2004) 
b.  0-6 Summary Index: 0 = most flexible, 6 = least flexible. Data are for 1998. Most recent data are 
available but due to privatizations since 1998 the indicator may be overstating the degree of inflexibility 
in 2003.  
 Source: Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000). 
c.  The tax wedge reflects income tax, employee contributions less cash benefits, and employer social 
security contributions as a percent of total labor cost. Income level at 100 percent of average production 
worker for single and primary earner and 67 percent for secondary earner in two-earner family. 
Source: OECD (2003). 
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Table 7  Labor relations court cases in select countries, 2003 
 
Country  Competent body 
Percentage  




of cases won  
by workers 






1.1  2.7  6–7 months 
France  Labor court  25.3  75  Approximately 
 1 year
a 







1.6  55  Approximately 




Service (ACAS) and 
employment  
tribunals (ET) 







EEOC, FMCS,  
NLRB, and federal 
courts 
0.03 (NLRB)  
and 0 (a total of 217 
cases) filed by 
EEOC before 
federal courts  
19.45 (NLRB)  
and 83 for  
federal courts 
Approximately  
3 years for NLRB 
n.a. = not available 
 
a. EIRO (2004a) shows that 57 percent of judgments were appealed against in 2000. 




Source: OECD (2004), table 2.1. 
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Spain 0.76  2.00 1.23 1.92 1.93 1.37 0.88 2.81 4.75 7.24 4.85  6.90 2.94 2.46 4.59
Standard deviations
Note:  Regional data are NUTS level 2 (European regions of 800,000 to 3 million inhabitants), except Denmark and Ireland, for which data are NUTS level 3 (150,000 to 800,000 
inhabitants).  Luxembourg is excluded due to small geographical size. US data are on state-level.      
Source: OECD, Eurostat Regional Labor Force Data, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.Figure 3  Changes in the labor force in European regions with more than 15 percent 
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3Figure 4    Changes in the labor force in European regions with more than 50 percent share 
                    of long-term unemployment
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PeloponnisosFigure 5  Average annual job turnover rates in existing companies 



















































































































































Public Expenditure on Labor Market Training (% of GDP)(1)
Business Spending on Continuing Vocational Training (% of Total Labor Costs)(2)
(1) Data for public expenditure are for most recent year between 2000 and 2002. Includes training for the unemployed, people at risk of 
unemployment, and the employed. Source: OECD Labor Force Indicators.
(2) Data for business spending are 1999. No data are available for Poland, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Britain, United States, and 
Hungary. Source: Eurostat (2003).